My colleagues and I have been doing some interesting work in developing non-credit based fixed income overlays.
By way of introduction, portable alpha received lots of negative press in 2008. The primary reason for this was the after -the -fact discovery that many of the alphas being ported were, in fact, betas. These betas were wrongly characterized alphas as a result of measurement against inappropriate benchmarks. And although many of these betas were uncorrelated to the portfolios they were being ported on to, the liquidity meltdown of 2008 drove correlations of seemingly independent betas to 1. This conditional correlation had the end result of leaving allocated portfolios with leveraged beta exposure, probably the last thing managers needed to tell their investment committees at that time.
We set out generate a strategy that reduced the Barclay's Intermediate Term Bond Index's overall volatility while increasing total return. Additionally, our goal was to do this without adding corporate credit risk.
To achieve a meaningful result, strategy generation must be robust with respect to survivor bias, rule generation, and implementation. All elements of any strategy must be formulated out of sample and all rules must be achievable in practice. Additionally, we propose a different way of looking at the portable alpha problem. Our main concern is the overlay's utility as a condition risk mitigation tool. Rather than simply juicing the strategy with normally uncorrelated returns, we seek to mitigate benchmark loss and improve the overall risk profile of the investment. We believe that this results in a better definition of alpha for our purposes.
To achieve a meaningful result, strategy generation must be robust with respect to survivor bias, rule generation, and implementation. All elements of any strategy must be formulated out of sample and all rules must be achievable in practice. Additionally, we propose a different way of looking at the portable alpha problem. Our main concern is the overlay's utility as a condition risk mitigation tool. Rather than simply juicing the strategy with normally uncorrelated returns, we seek to mitigate benchmark loss and improve the overall risk profile of the investment. We believe that this results in a better definition of alpha for our purposes.
The resultant strategy (abbreviated AO), partitions the yield curve into multiple maturity sectors and runs multiple behavioral models in each. The models have zero correlation between them and thus extract quite different patterns from the market. Holding periods range from about 5 weeks down to well under 1 week. With no overlap, the models find opportunities in all market conditions.
For purposes of risk analysis, we have highlighted two exogenous event types that both asset and liability driven investors should find of particular interest. Months in which significant Capital Markets dislocations occurred are highlighted in yellow. Months in which significant Insurance Loss events occurred are highlighted in red. We labeled 9/11 orange as it represents both. Event details and statistics are noted below.
The following table illustrates AO’s monthly returns to Capital Market dislocations. The conditional returns are strongly positive and statistically significant, whilst remaining unaffected by large Insurance Loss events.
*All returns are Net of Managment and Performance Fees. All returns net of financing and transaction fees
On a monthly basis, the AO overlay outperformed the benchmark only return 92% of the time, added no benefit 6% of time, and underperformed 2% of the time. There was no serial auto-correlation to the under performance.
Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | TOT | |
1997 | 0.03% | 1.18% | 0.21% | 0.44% | 0.25% | 0.97% | 0.44% | 0.38% | 0.02% | 0.46% | -0.01% | 4.38% | |
1998 | 0.32% | 0.62% | -0.07% | 0.02% | 0.62% | 0.76% | 0.43% | 0.71% | 1.46% | 1.36% | 0.32% | 0.34% | 6.90% |
1999 | 0.78% | 0.56% | -0.53% | 0.48% | 1.24% | 0.49% | 0.05% | 0.27% | 0.24% | -0.18% | -0.19% | 0.66% | 3.86% |
2000 | 0.91% | -0.21% | 1.16% | -0.20% | -0.20% | 0.38% | 0.40% | 0.66% | 0.54% | 0.21% | 0.53% | 1.29% | 5.45% |
2001 | 1.49% | 0.95% | 1.01% | 0.43% | 0.51% | 0.32% | 0.14% | 1.13% | 1.36% | 1.20% | -1.92% | 1.10% | 7.73% |
2002 | -0.28% | 0.66% | 0.87% | -0.36% | -0.17% | -0.04% | 2.25% | 0.43% | 0.49% | -0.13% | 0.05% | -0.13% | 3.65% |
2003 | -0.24% | 0.52% | -0.74% | -0.18% | 0.21% | 0.84% | 2.89% | 0.55% | 0.32% | 0.19% | -0.54% | 0.46% | 4.28% |
2004 | -0.18% | 0.37% | -0.73% | 1.23% | 0.23% | 0.95% | 0.73% | 0.37% | -0.31% | -0.60% | 0.19% | 0.06% | 2.31% |
2005 | 0.40% | 0.83% | 0.20% | 1.02% | 0.26% | 0.24% | 0.37% | 0.08% | -0.11% | 0.96% | -0.24% | 0.77% | 4.76% |
2006 | -0.06% | 0.22% | -0.22% | 0.96% | 0.32% | -0.23% | 0.41% | 0.58% | 0.64% | 0.26% | 0.75% | 0.64% | 4.28% |
2007 | 0.26% | 0.93% | 0.58% | 0.05% | 0.33% | 0.18% | 0.54% | 0.38% | 0.33% | -0.03% | 1.78% | 0.59% | 5.92% |
2008 | 1.15% | 0.24% | 0.92% | 0.03% | 1.20% | 1.19% | -0.29% | 0.05% | 1.25% | 0.33% | 2.88% | 1.86% | 10.82% |
2009 | 1.25% | 0.63% | 0.69% | 0.07% | 0.24% | 0.12% | -0.01% | -0.46% | 0.04% | -0.09% | -0.52% | -0.15% | 1.81% |
*All returns are Net of Fees |
*All returns are Net of Managment and Performance Fees. All returns net of financing and transaction fees
The following tables illustrate AO's non-correlated returns to the Barclays Aggregate and Government bond benchmarks while significantly outperforming during Stressful Market Events.
Capital Markets Events All Returns are Gross for Purposes of Comparison | ||||
Date | AO Return | 2YR Gov Index* | Intermediate Agg. ** | |
Russian Financial Crisis / LTCM | Sep-98 | 1.46% | 0.38% | 0.41% |
Dot Com Bubble Burst | Jan-01 | 1.49% | 1.18% | 1.61% |
9/11 Terrorist Attacks | Sep-01 | 1.36% | 2.07% | 1.50% |
Enron Bankruptcy | Nov-01 | 1.10% | -0.48% | -0.48% |
US ISM Survey Tightening Fears | Mar-02 | 0.87% | -1.53% | -1.33% |
WorldCom Bankruptcy | Jul-02 | 2.25% | 2.00% | 1.20% |
Rate Hike Fears | Jul-03 | 2.89% | -2.19% | -2.41% |
Fed Rate Tightening Fears | Apr-04 | 1.23% | -2.26% | -2.15% |
Bear Sterns Collapse | Mar-08 | 0.92% | 0.65% | 0.39% |
Lehman Bankruptcy | Sep-08 | 1.25% | 0.67% | -0.97% |
Bank Liquidity Fears | Oct-08 | 0.33% | 0.67% | -1.79% |
Event Risk Summary All Returns are Gross for Purposes of Comparison | |||
Average Returns for | AO | 2YR Gov Index* | Intermediate Agg** |
Capital Markets Events | 1.37% | 0.10% | -0.37% |
All Other Months | 0.35% | 0.49% | 0.56% |
The AO active management of Government Securities creates a risk and return benefit that cannot be reproduced by adding a passive Treasury Benchmark, as evidenced by the correlation comparison below.
Correlations Comparison | |||
AO | 2YR Gov Bond Index* | ||
To 2YR Gov Index* | To Barclays Intermediate** | To Barclays Intermediate** | |
For Capital Markets Events | -12.63% | 5.18% | 86.68% |
For Non Event Months | 32.95% | 30.40% | 88.36% |
* 2 Year Barclays Govt Bond Index **Benchmark is the Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Total Return Index (BBG Code LC08TRUU) Note: For analysis Sep-01 data removed from insurance correlation as it is in Capital Markets Correlation Data. Francis and Charlie data used once in correlation |
The following tables highlight AO's utility.
An overlay would have added value to the Barclays Intermediate Bond Index bench mark in every year since 1997, regardless of Interest Rate environment, or market conditions. On a monthly basis, the AO overlay outperformed the benchmark only return 92% of the time, added no benefit 6% of time, and underperformed 2% of the time. There was no serial auto-correlation to the under performance.
AO 130/30 (AP) vs. Barclays Intermediate 1997 – 2009 (all Returns in percent) | Added | AP vs. Index | |||||||||||||||
AP | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Annual Net | Value In % | Count | Monthly Win Loss | |
1997 | AP | 0.00 | 0.25 | -0.44 | 1.39 | 1.01 | 1.08 | 2.25 | -0.28 | 1.31 | 1.11 | 0.39 | 0.84 | 8.82 | 1.15 | 9 | Outperforms |
Barclays | 0.00 | 0.24 | -0.78 | 1.33 | 0.88 | 1.01 | 1.97 | -0.40 | 1.20 | 1.11 | 0.26 | 0.84 | 7.67 | 0 | Underperforms | ||
1998 | AP | 1.28 | 0.21 | 0.34 | 0.53 | 0.89 | 0.80 | 0.54 | 1.52 | 2.41 | 0.27 | 0.29 | 0.51 | 9.40 | 1.79 | 10 | Outperforms |
Barclays | 1.19 | 0.03 | 0.36 | 0.53 | 0.71 | 0.58 | 0.41 | 1.31 | 1.99 | -0.12 | 0.20 | 0.41 | 7.60 | 1 | Underperforms | ||
1999 | AP | 0.84 | -0.88 | 0.56 | 0.51 | -0.33 | 0.04 | -0.34 | 0.12 | 1.31 | 0.34 | 0.05 | -0.11 | 2.01 | 1.01 | 9 | Outperforms |
Barclays | 0.62 | -1.04 | 0.72 | 0.37 | -0.68 | -0.10 | -0.36 | 0.04 | 1.24 | 0.39 | 0.10 | -0.30 | 1.00 | 3 | Underperforms | ||
2000 | AP | -0.32 | 0.90 | 1.40 | -0.15 | 0.04 | 2.05 | 0.83 | 1.52 | 1.13 | 0.64 | 1.58 | 2.13 | 11.60 | 1.42 | 9 | Outperforms |
Barclays | -0.58 | 0.96 | 1.07 | -0.10 | 0.10 | 1.94 | 0.71 | 1.33 | 0.97 | 0.58 | 1.43 | 1.76 | 10.18 | 3 | Underperforms | ||
2001 | AP | 2.04 | 1.06 | 0.97 | 0.04 | 0.75 | 0.39 | 2.00 | 1.29 | 1.89 | 1.89 | -1.54 | -0.17 | 10.40 | 2.01 | 11 | Outperforms |
Barclays | 1.61 | 0.79 | 0.67 | -0.08 | 0.60 | 0.30 | 1.96 | 0.97 | 1.50 | 1.54 | -0.99 | -0.48 | 8.39 | 1 | Underperforms | ||
2002 | AP | 0.63 | 1.15 | -1.08 | 1.69 | 0.83 | 0.86 | 1.84 | 1.32 | 1.48 | -0.10 | -0.10 | 1.68 | 10.10 | 0.95 | 6 | Outperforms |
Barclays | 0.71 | 0.96 | -1.33 | 1.79 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 1.20 | 1.20 | 1.34 | -0.06 | -0.12 | 1.71 | 9.14 | 6 | Underperforms | ||
2003 | AP | 0.03 | 1.26 | -0.15 | 0.57 | 1.30 | 0.26 | -1.58 | 0.59 | 2.30 | -0.64 | 0.01 | 1.09 | 4.94 | 1.12 | 8 | Outperforms |
Barclays | 0.10 | 1.11 | 0.06 | 0.62 | 1.24 | 0.02 | -2.41 | 0.43 | 2.21 | -0.70 | 0.17 | 0.96 | 3.82 | 4 | Underperforms | ||
2004 | AP | 0.60 | 1.06 | 0.44 | -1.79 | -0.28 | 0.80 | 1.08 | 1.74 | 0.08 | 0.56 | -0.59 | 0.71 | 4.34 | 0.61 | 8 | Outperforms |
Barclays | 0.65 | 0.95 | 0.65 | -2.15 | -0.35 | 0.53 | 0.87 | 1.64 | 0.17 | 0.73 | -0.64 | 0.69 | 3.73 | 4 | Underperforms | ||
2005 | AP | 0.46 | -0.28 | -0.33 | 1.43 | 0.93 | 0.47 | -0.61 | 1.09 | -0.77 | -0.34 | 0.32 | 1.00 | 3.26 | 1.24 | 10 | Outperforms |
Barclays | 0.34 | -0.52 | -0.38 | 1.14 | 0.86 | 0.40 | -0.71 | 1.07 | -0.74 | -0.61 | 0.39 | 0.78 | 2.02 | 2 | Underperforms | ||
2006 | AP | 0.11 | 0.30 | -0.67 | 0.31 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 1.38 | 1.51 | 0.95 | 0.69 | 1.24 | -0.18 | 5.62 | 1.12 | 9 | Outperforms |
Barclays | 0.12 | 0.23 | -0.61 | 0.04 | -0.08 | 0.17 | 1.26 | 1.35 | 0.76 | 0.61 | 1.02 | -0.37 | 4.51 | 3 | Underperforms | ||
2007 | AP | 0.10 | 1.60 | 0.37 | 0.49 | -0.54 | -0.14 | 0.95 | 1.29 | 0.86 | 0.80 | 2.25 | 0.49 | 8.37 | 1.54 | 11 | Outperforms |
Barclays | 0.03 | 1.33 | 0.21 | 0.48 | -0.63 | -0.19 | 0.79 | 1.18 | 0.76 | 0.81 | 1.74 | 0.32 | 6.83 | 1 | Underperforms | ||
2008 | AP | 2.09 | 0.26 | 0.65 | -0.22 | -0.24 | 0.19 | -0.08 | 0.86 | -0.61 | -1.69 | 3.38 | 3.38 | 7.66 | 2.80 | 11 | Outperforms |
Barclays | 1.76 | 0.19 | 0.39 | -0.23 | -0.58 | -0.15 | 0.00 | 0.85 | -0.97 | -1.79 | 2.55 | 2.84 | 4.86 | 1 | Underperforms | ||
2009 | AP | 0.14 | -0.03 | 1.54 | 0.67 | 0.76 | 0.36 | 1.37 | 0.79 | 0.90 | 0.61 | 1.13 | -1.41 | 6.64 | 0.32 | 7 | Outperforms |
Barclays | -0.22 | -0.21 | 1.35 | 0.65 | 0.69 | 0.33 | 1.37 | 0.92 | 0.89 | 0.63 | 1.28 | -1.37 | 6.31 | 4 | Underperforms | ||
* All AP Returns are Net of Fees. |
AO130/30 Overlay vs. Barclays Intermediate Aggregate Bond Index 1997-2009
KEY STATISTICS | Barclays Inter. Agg* | AO Net of Repo** | 130/30 Overlay | AO Real Money*** |
Annualized Avg. Return | 5.88% | 5.12% | 7.41% | 7.25% |
Annualized Std. Dev. | 2.98% | 2.18% | 2.97% | 2.90% |
Information Ratio | 1.97 | 2.35 | 2.39 | 2.50% |
*Barclays Intermediate Aggregate Index includes Repo Return **AO Real Money defined as AO with no Net Borrowing |
The key driver to the attractiveness of AO as an overlay candidate is the strategy's low conditional correlation to exogenous events that tend to drive lowly correlated betas to high correlation. From an allocators prospective, these periods are precisely the times when low correlations need to occur.
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